smart framing for cases where platforms need a fact about you, not your whole life story. the tradeoff is that privacy claims live or die on exactly what gets logged around each check, so that part deserves plain english.
ONE - Anonymous Identity Infrastructure
Private, passkey-first identity with user-held encryption and anonymous age verification.
3 ratings3.54
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CategoryUtilities
PlatformWeb
PricingFree trial
ONE offers a privacy-focused identity infrastructure that enables users to verify private information such as age or personhood with passkey-first authentication and user-held encryption keys. It allows reusable, anonymous verification proofs without exposing personally identifiable information (PII) to applications.
privacy
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CategoryUtilities
PlatformsWeb
PricingFree trial
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ListedAugust 2026
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Show HN45 source points · 27 comments
If you could combine this with the google oath experience somehow like age verification of my google account? I would def use that.
akshay_akula · Imported from Show HN
> When identity documents are uploaded, they are encrypted using a master encryption key derived from the user’s passkey during authentication. ONE still sees identity documents in the clear the first time when it verifies them, right? Otherwise we could upload fakes. Also I'm not familiar with Oauth 2.0, but doesn't ONE know the client and relying party on each verification transaction? So ONE could theoretically store records of who accessed which website, perhaps by mistaken logging configuration or because they were coerced by law enforcement. Anyway I appreciate the consideration given to privacy.
tangotaylor · Imported from Show HN
I wrote up more of the thinking behind this here for those interested: https://loginwithone.com/blog/the-internet-should-be-more-li...
mikeysight · Imported from Show HN
"One stores ciphertext: encrypted blobs created with a key held by the user. Never the underlying identity data. This includes government ID and selfie data, as well as the verified email associated with the account. " Why does it need to store even encrypted data after the result is +18, for example? Does ONE need to keep validating against the same documents every time?
thcr · Imported from Show HN
There are (at least) two problems to solve. The first is to anonymously verify properties about the user (e.g. age) and the second is to only allow the legitimate person verify themself. An national electronic id would provide users with the possibility to verify their age, that they are a physical person and so on, but in the basic case it gives their identity away to any system they use. Letting someone else use your id-card is in many countries illegal and comes with possible negative consequences. Share access to my e-id would allow them to access my bank account, take loans in my name, file for tax returns and a whole bunch of other stuff. So: e-id is not anonymous but usually kept from unauthorized use. One solves the anonymity part. Is the document in the encrypted blob accessible by the user? Can my identity be shared with websites? Basically: what stops someone from sharing their One passkey? What stops me from letting my AI agents use it, share it with my younger cousin or sell it online?
icermann · Imported from Show HN